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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1992, a fifth-grade girl complained to her public school teacher that
the boy sitting next to her repeatedly  rubbed his body against her and1
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1. The harassment continued regularly for a four-month period. Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
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made sexually explicit comments to her.  After school authorities ignored2
her repeated complaints, the student filed suit against the school board.3
The United States Supreme Court held that a private cause of action under
Title IX existed against the school board for student-on-student
harassment.4
In 1993, a ninth-grade female student had sex with her public school
social studies teacher over a period of six months.  Once police discovered5
the relationship, the teacher was fired, his teaching certificate was revoked,
and the student and her mother filed suit against the school district.  Had6
a school supervisor known of the harassment and been deliberately
indifferent to it, the school district would have been liable for the
teacher-on-student harassment.7
In 2000, a female public school teacher resigned from her job after a
male student sexually harassed her for two months.  The teacher reported8
the harassment to school administrators, but when they failed to stop the
harassment, the teacher sued the Department of Education.  The court9
allowed a cause of action under Title VII  for student-on-teacher10
harassment.11
Although sexual harassment occurs in all workplaces, courts have been
slower to recognize its impact in schools.  Beginning in the early 1990s,12
federal courts progressively recognized the need for protection of students
2. Id. at 633–34.
3. Id. at 635.
4. Id. at 633, 654.
5. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1998) (noting that had a
supervisory employee been put on notice of this conduct and had the employee deliberately failed
to act to end the harassment, the school district would have been liable for the teacher-on-student
harassment under Title IX).
6. Id. at 278.
7. Id. at 290.
8. Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 175 (D.P.R. 2005). Although there was no
Supreme Court or federal appellate decision on point, the district court recognized that courts have
held schools liable for teacher-on-student harassment, supervisor-on-teacher harassment, and
harassment by non-employees, such as customers or clients. Id. at 180–81. Likewise, the court
reasoned that this student-on-teacher harassment is highly analogous to these types of harassment.
Id. at 182. Moreover, the court found support in recent opinions from New York and Illinois and
in Title VII’s goal to eliminate all forms of sex discrimination in the workplace. Id. at 181–82.
Accordingly, holding schools liable for sexual harassment by students supports this goal and is
consistent with recent legal precedent. Id. at 182. The court denied the school’s motion for
summary judgment and held that a jury should decide whether two months was long enough for
appropriate corrective action. Id. at 182, 184.
9. Id. at 175.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. Id. at 182, 184; see also infra notes 136–45 and accompanying text.
12. Natalie J. Malovich & Jayne E. Stake, Sexual Harassment on Campus: Individual
Differences in Attitudes and Beliefs, 14 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 63, 63 (1990).
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and school employees from sexual harassment. Courts have acted
extensively against student-on-student harassment and teacher-on-student
harassment.  However, victims of student-on-teacher harassment have not13
been so fortunate. Judges have been reluctant to extend to teachers legal
protections, which were originally designed to protect students. Such
hesitation shows that courts have not caught on to how the power
dynamics in the classroom have changed. Once, students were always the
victims of harassment. Today, teachers are as often the prey of students
who can belittle and degrade them without legal consequence.
This Note argues that teachers who are victims of sexual harassment by
their students should be afforded the same federal protections under Title
VII as students who are the victims of sexual harassment. Part II discusses
the protections of federal laws that have been extended to victims of
student-on-student and teacher-on-student sexual harassment. Part II also
explains how Title IX fails to adequately provide relief to teachers as
victims of student-on-teacher harassment. Part III discusses the application
of Title VII to teachers as victims of sexual harassment in a hostile work
environment and details the limited success of teachers who have sought
remedy under Title VII. Part III also discusses the potential for a relaxed
standard for special-education students as perpetrators of sexual
harassment. Finally, Part IV concludes that holding public schools
accountable for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII will
give teachers the protection they need and deserve as victims of sexual
discrimination.
II.  A HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
There are numerous definitions of sexual harassment in academia.14
These definitions usually include one or more of the following
characteristics: the offender has power over the victim, the behavior is
unwanted (as perceived by the victim), and there is some negative outcome
such as distress or interference with activities (as perceived by the
victim).  Perhaps in more practical terms, “sexual harassment is any15
13. See infra Part II.A–B. The standards for claims of sexual harassment by teachers and
students in our nation’s public schools have been clearly established and widely publicized.
14. See generally Phyllis L. Crocker, An Analysis of University Definitions of Sexual
Harassment, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 696 (1983) (evaluating definitions of sexual
harassment used by undergraduate institutions in their policy statements and grievance procedures). 
15. Nick Maroules & Kathleen McKinney, Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL COERCION: A
SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES AND PREVENTION 29, 29 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A.
Koralewski eds., 1991). The authors set forth a summary of studies that found most incidents of
sexual harassment in academia are not reported. Id. at 37. 
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unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature that interferes with [an
individual’s] life.”16
A.  The Protections of Title VII: Sexual Harassment in
Employment Law
“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits victims of
employment discrimination based upon race, color, national origin,
religion, or sex to collect compensatory damages for sexual
harassment . . . .”  “Congress enacted Title VII to recognize the inequity17
that exists among different groups of workers and designed it to level the
playing field in the workplace.”  Verbal or physical conduct such as18
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors constitutes
sexual harassment when this conduct explicitly or implicitly affects an
individual’s employment, unreasonably interferes with an individual’s
work performance, or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.  Remedies for victims of sexual harassment include19
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.20
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
distinguished two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo harassment
and hostile work environment harassment.  Quid pro quo harassment21
occurs when sexually charged advances or sexual favors are traded for
16. ROBERT J. SHOOP & JACK W. HAYHOW, JR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS:
WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED TO KNOW TO SPOT IT AND STOP IT! 12 (1994). Unwelcome
behavior indicates the action or behavior was not solicited and not asked for, nor did the person
respond with similar behavior. Behavior of a sexual nature is “virtually any conduct that refers to
sex,” including the use of profane language, making comments about body parts, and any kind of
unwanted touching or request for sexual favors.
17. MARY ANN MANOS, KNOWING WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE: ETHICAL AND LEGAL
STANDARDS FOR BEST CLASSROOM PRACTICE 42 (2006). Title VII applies to employers that have
fifteen or more employees, including state and local governments, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and the federal government.
18. Liesa L. Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any
Place in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII After Harris, 46 FLA. L.
REV. 291, 309 (1994). 
19. Id. 
20. MANOS, supra note 17, at 42; see also DEP’T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, PUBLIC SCH. OF
N.C., A GUIDE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 5,
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/federalprograms/titleIX/training/sexualharassmentguide.pdf
(last visited Dec. 26, 2008) [hereinafter GUIDE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT] (“Remedies under Title
VII for Sexual Harassment [include]: (A) Injunctive relief to stop the harassment and prevent any
further harassment[;] (B) Reinstatement and back pay, if a job or promotion was lost due to the
harassment[;] (C) Compensatory and punitive damages ranging from $50,000 for employers with
15-100 employees to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees[; and] (D) Attorney’s
fees.”).
21. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2008) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
4
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employee evaluations, promotions, or other job benefits.  Hostile work22
environment harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual conduct creates
difficult working conditions.23
In the 1986 landmark case, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,  the24
United States Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment as a form
of employment discrimination under Title VII.  In Meritor, the plaintiff25
alleged she had a forced sexual relationship with her supervisor, “which
was consensual only in that she had agreed to some of the sex out of fear
of losing her job.”  Her employer argued that “even if the sexual26
relationship had existed, it was unknown to them, so they should not be
held responsible for the acts of the supervisor.”  The Court concluded that27
conduct severe or pervasive enough “‘to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment’” is
actionable as employment discrimination.28
In 1993, the Supreme Court further defined the standards to be applied
in evaluating allegations of sexual harassment.  Holding that “hostile29
work environment harassment is not limited to cases in which the
employee suffers actual psychological damage,”  the Court insisted the30
plaintiff show that the conduct was subjectively offensive to her. In
addition to a victim’s subjective belief, a reasonable, objective person
must also perceive the conduct as hostile or abusive.31
B.  The Protections of Title IX: Sexual Harassment in Education Law
At the time of its passage, “Title VII specifically excluded educational
institutions from its coverage.”  Moreover, sex discrimination against32
students was not specifically prohibited by any federal statute.  “An33
awareness of this exclusion and a commitment to equity resulted in the
22. LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS AN ETHICAL ISSUE IN ACADEMIC
LIFE 49 (2001).
23. Id.
24. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
25. Id. at 73.
26. FRANCIS, supra note 22, at 49.
27. Id.
28. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.
1982) (alteration in original)).
29. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
30. FRANCIS, supra note 22, at 50.
31. Id.; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”).
32. Robert J. Shoop, The Legal Context of Sexual Harassment on Campus, in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 146, 147 (Linda LeMoncheck & James P. Sterba eds., 2001).
33. Id.
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passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.”  The drafters34
of Title IX, as shown through legislative history, “make[] it clear that
Congress intended to apply Title VII claims standards to Title IX,”  in35
effect creating a private cause of action under Title IX.  Specifically,36
Congress passed Title IX to combat widespread discrimination against
girls and women in education.  Sexual harassment is a form of sex37
discrimination under Title IX,  which protects students from sexual38
harassment in essentially the same manner that Title VII protects
employees.39
As a natural extension of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Title
IX proscribes sex discrimination in education programs or activities
receiving federal funds,  and essentially applies the principles and40
guidelines of Title VII to education.  Unlike Title VII, which is enforced41
by the EEOC, Title IX is enforced by the Office for Civil Rights of the
U.S. Department of Education.  Title IX specifically provides that “[n]o42
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”  An institution found in violation of Title IX faces43
withdrawal of federal funds.  Title IX protections extend to students at all44
levels of education.45
In a 1992 benchmark ruling, the Supreme Court held that student
victims of sexual harassment could recover monetary damages from their
34. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on sex in any
federally funded educational programs or activities).
35. Shoop, supra note 32, at 147.
36. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
37. STEPHEN J. MOREWITZ, SEXUAL HARASSMENT & SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
304 (1996).
38. Shoop, supra note 32, at 148. “Under Title IX, sexual harassment is defined as ‘verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a
recipient that denies, limits, or provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits,
services, or treatment protected under Title IX.’” Id.
39. SHOOP & HAYHOW, JR., supra note 16, at 14.
40. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982).
41. Dan H. Wishnietsky & Dennis Felder, The Effect of Franklin v. Gwinnett County on
Sexual Harassment Policy in Secondary Education, INITIATIVES, vol. 56, No. 1, 1994, at 37, 38.
42. Sandra Shullman & Barbara Watts, Legal Issues, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ON CAMPUS 251, 252, 255–56 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
44. See Shullman & Watts, supra note 42, at 256.
45. Shoop, supra note 32, at 148. 
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school districts under Title IX.  In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public46
Schools,  a teacher coerced a student into sexual intercourse, phoned her47
at home, and requested social meetings.  School officials took no action48
to stop the harassing behavior.  The Court held that “a damages remedy49
is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX,”  reasoning that50
“Congress intended to let students try for monetary damages and
compensation when it passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.”51
C.  Student-on-Student and Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, sexual harassment occurs all
too often in school.  The U.S. Department of Justice gathers reports of52
sexual assault, rape, and sexually oriented verbal assault from school
districts across the country.  “Amazingly, in one year (1996–1997),53
approximately 2,500 rapes, sexual assaults, or other student-to-student
sexual batteries were reported.”  On the whole, student-on-student sexual54
harassment parallels harassment found in the employment context and has
no single identifiable cause.  Studies show such harassment may begin as55
early as elementary school, when students are initially exposed to social
interactions from which gender-defining roles stem.56
Courts have continually struggled with establishing what constitutes
sexual harassment or abuse.  “The original definition of sexual57
harassment came from the workplace and has been applied to
education . . . .”  Because the components of what constitutes sexual58
46. Susan Strauss, Sexual Harassment in K-12, in ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL, SOCIAL SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 105, 126 (Michele Paludi & Carmen A. Paludi, Jr. eds., 2003). 
47. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id. at 64.
50. Id. at 76.
51. Susan L. Webb, The History of Sexual Harassment on the Job, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
ISSUES AND ANSWERS 136, 144 (Linda LeMoncheck & James P. Sterba eds., 2001).
52. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998) (“The number of
reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in schools confirms that harassment is an
all too common aspect of the educational experience.”); see also MANOS, supra note 17, at 42.
“Sexual harassment by both school employers and students is a common occurrence in the modern
American school.” MANOS, supra note 17, at 40.
53. See MANOS, supra note 17, at 42.
54. Id.
55. ROSEMARIE SKAINE, POWER AND GENDER: ISSUES IN SEXUAL DOMINANCE AND
HARASSMENT 256 (1996).
56. Id.
57. See Strauss, supra note 46, at 122–23. 
58. Id. at 123.
7
Shane: Teachers as Sexual Harassment Victims: The Inequitable Protection
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
362 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
harassment “‘come from adult-to-adult experience, they fall short when
applied to sexual abuse and harassment of students. Whether welcome or
not, sexual contact between adults and minors is a criminal act.’”59
A 2001 survey by the American Association of University Women
(AAUW) revealed most student victims of unwanted sexual advances at
school do not report them to adults.  In cases of physical harassment, only60
11% of students who were sexually harassed reported the incident to a
teacher, 22% reported it to a parent or family member, and 20% did not
divulge the problem to anyone.  “Frequently, the student victims are too61
embarrassed or intimidated to report the undesirable sexual advances.
[They] feel they will be ignored, further ostracized, and humiliated if they
report the incidents. They also fear retaliation from other students,
teachers, administrators, and parents.”  This low percentage of62
victimization reporting by students demonstrates the difficulty of
discovering precise figures of sexual harassment. Nevertheless, when
students have been successfully surveyed, “it is obvious that sexual
harassment is a problem.”  63
A 1995 study revealed that most of the abusers in public schools were
heterosexual males who most often sexually abused females.  “The64
teachers who harass/abuse are often popular, well-liked individuals
thought of as stellar teachers by students, staff, and parents.”  Even65
though the bad decisions of a small group of faculty cast a shadow on the
teaching profession, it is important to remember that most teachers do not
sexually harass students.66
The Supreme Court in the late 1990s decided two cases that support the
idea of holding school districts liable for student-on-teacher
harassment—although the cases do not address the issue directly. The first
case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided in 1998,
established that school districts may be held liable for teacher-on-student
harassment within public schools  if a school official with the authority67
to stop the abuse knew about it and demonstrated a “deliberate
59. Id. (quoting Charol Shakeshaft & Audrey Cohan, Sexual Abuse of Students by School
Personnel, 76 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 512, 514 (1995)). 
60. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING, TEASING,
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 29–30 (2001) [hereinafter HOSTILE HALLWAYS] (noting that
the majority of students would most likely tell a friend about sexual harassment). 
61. Id. 
62. MOREWITZ, supra note 37, at 300. 
63. Strauss, supra note 46, at 124. 
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kenneth R. Wilson & Linda A. Kraus, Sexual Harassment in the University, 24 J. C.
STUDENT PERSONNEL 219, 224 (1983).
67. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
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indifference” by failing to remedy the abuse.  In Gebser, a male teacher68
seduced a fourteen-year-old female student, and kissed, fondled, and had
a sexual relationship with her.  Because the student did not report the69
behavior to school authorities, the Court decided the school district could
not be held liable for the teacher-on-student harassment.  70
In the second case, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the
Court, resolving a circuit split,  ruled school districts may be held liable71
for student-on-student sexual harassment if the districts knew about the
harassment and failed to stop it.  In Davis, a female student in the fifth72
grade was repeatedly “touched, grabbed, and verbally harassed by a male
classmate.”  After complaints of the harassment to school officials failed,73
the victim’s parents filed suit “against the school district for permitting a
sexually hostile environment to exist.”74
Teacher-on-student sexual harassment was first recognized as
actionable in 1992 by the Franklin court,  six years after the Supreme75
Court’s landmark holding in Meritor.  As recently as 1999, the Court76
established a basis for school liability for student-on-student sexual
harassment.  Prior to these judicial breakthroughs by the Supreme Court,77
however, lower courts were hesitant to walk the precedent-setting plank,
unwilling to extend the protections of Title VII to students as victims of
sexual harassment. 
68. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–93; see also Strauss, supra note 46, at 127. In addition, actual
notice to school authorities is required: 
[T]he parents’ complaint to the principal concerning Waldrop’s comments in class
was the only one Lago Vista had received about Waldrop, and that evidence was
inadequate to raise a genuine issue on whether the school district had actual or
constructive notice that Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with a
student.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 279.
69. Id. at 277–78.
70. Id.; see also ROBERTA WETZEL & NINA W. BROWN, STUDENT-GENERATED SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 26 (2000).
71. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999); see also Nan Stein,
Sexual Harassment Meets Zero Tolerance: Life in K-12 Schools, in ZERO TOLERANCE: RESISTING
THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 143, 144 (William Ayers et al. eds., 2001). For a
discussion of Davis’ application to school cyber harassment, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student
Speech in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1094–96 (2008).
72. See Stein, supra note 71, at 144.
73. See id. at 143.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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D.  Teaching in a Hostile Educational Environment: Why Title IX
Doesn’t Cut It 
Although “Title IX is one of the most sweeping sex discrimination laws
ever passed,” case law shows its protections are only effective for students,
not teachers.  Students who, by default, are not employees of the school78
that they attend, and who are sexually harassed by a teacher, have no
recourse under Title VII. Students must proceed under Title IX for relief
because Title VII only applies to employer-employee relations.79
Conversely, for teachers who fall victim to sexual harassment by students,
Title IX is an ineffective method for providing adequate relief. As Davis
established, Title IX provides a private cause of action against the school
authority for damages in cases of student-on-student harassment.  A80
victimized teacher’s better option is Title VII, which should, and to a
limited extent does, permit causes of action against public school
districts.81
In the 1998 Gebser decision “analyzing the vicarious liability of
education institutions . . . the Court regarded Title VII and Title IX as
having very different goals and refused to apply agency principles at all to
Title IX.”  Because courts continue to regard agency principles as the82
basis of liability under Title VII, the refusal to apply agency principles to
Title IX supports the conclusion that Title IX alone does not provide
adequate relief for teachers as victims of sexual harassment by their
students. Even though private causes of action in tort or other common-law
theories are available to victims, a teacher’s Title VII suit against their
school district should be a viable option capable of producing a successful
recovery.
III.  THE APPLICATION OF TITLE VII TO TEACHERS AS VICTIMS OF
STUDENT-ON-TEACHER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
“Few if any studies have investigated the question of sexual harassment
toward school faculty.”  A study conducted by the AAUW revealed that83
“36 percent of high school students reported that students do indeed
sexually harass teachers and other school personnel.”  Although less84
78. SHOOP & HAYHOW, JR., supra note 16, at 80.
79. Elizabeth A. Keller, Consensual Amorous Relationships Between Faculty and Students:
The Constitutional Right to Privacy, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS
21, 25 (Edmund Wall ed., 2000).
80. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1999). 
81. See infra Part III.B.
82. FRANCIS, supra note 22, at 52.
83. MANOS, supra note 17, at 40.
84. Id. at 40–41; see also HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 60, at 14. 
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researched than student-on-student and teacher-on-student sexual
harassment, harassment of teachers by students is becoming more
commonplace.  The AAUW study concluded that while both male and85
female faculty members may be victims, “sexual harassment is directed
more at women than men.”  “From 1995 to 1999, more than 73,00086
incidents of violence (which includes sexual battery and rape) against
teachers were reported,”  even though “many incidents go unreported.”87 88
Teachers who are victims of sexual harassment within their classrooms
are handicapped when attempting to recover damages. Claims for
student-on-teacher harassment brought under Title VII have not enjoyed
much success.  This Part argues that actions brought pursuant to Title VII89
should be universally recognized by courts as a means of recovery for
teachers who are victims of sexual harassment. This Part establishes a
framework using agency theory, under which claims of student-on-teacher
sexual harassment brought under Title VII should be successful. 
A.  Hostile Educational Environment Claims Under Title VII
Courts have established that “sexual behaviors or comments that create
a hostile or offensive educational environment can violate Title IX.”  For90
a successful hostile educational environment claim, a pattern of harassing
behavior is required.  Courts have developed the “reasonable person”91
standard, which asks “whether a reasonable [person] would find the
behaviors sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect work conditions and
establish a hostile work environment.”  The issue of whether a sexual92
advance was welcomed is “relevant in cases involving sexual harassment
among employees,” but ordinarily should not arise in school settings.  93
Unlike Title IX claims brought by students, “[c]laims brought [by
teachers] pursuant to Title VII are analyzed under a burden-shifting
85. See Strauss, supra note 46, at 128.
86. MANOS, supra note 17, at 41.
87. Id. at 42; see also PHILLIP KAUFMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2001 73 (2001) (indicating a total of 68,700 serious
violent crimes against teachers, including rape, sexual assault, aggravated assault, and robbery
against school teachers in the time period between 1995 and 1999) (emphasis added). 
88. MANOS, supra note 17, at 42. 
89. See infra Part III.C.
90. MOREWITZ, supra note 37, at 305–06; see also ROBERT J. SHOOP & DEBRA L. EDWARDS,
HOW TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK AND CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR
ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS 20–21 (1994).
91. See MOREWITZ, supra note 37, at 306.
92. Id. (emphasis added). See also Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001).
“In order to be actionable, the harassment must be so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions
of the victim’s employment and creates an abusive environment.” Id.
93. Id.
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framework.”  If a plaintiff in a Title VII action makes a prima facie94
showing of sex discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendants “to
establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.”  If95
defendants successfully carry this burden, “the presumption of
discrimination drops from the case, and plaintiff must ‘cast sufficient
doubt’ upon defendants’ proffered reasons to permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the [defendants’] reasons are fabricated.”  “It96
is well established that a plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of Title VII
by proving that sexual harassment created a hostile or abusive work
environment.”  In order to establish a prima facie Title VII claim97
premised on a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
he or she: “‘(1) suffered intentional discrimination because of [his or her]
sex; (2) the discrimination was [severe or pervasive]; (3) the
discrimination detrimentally affected . . .  [the] plaintiff; (4) the
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same
sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability.’”  A prima facie showing, therefore, contains both a subjective98
standard—that a plaintiff was in fact affected—and an objective
94. Mongelli v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 2d 467, 478 (D. Del.
2007).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 479 (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
97. Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999). “[T]o determine
whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive, courts must look to the totality of the
circumstances, including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Mongelli, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 479 (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
98. Id. at 479 (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990)
(alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)). When the plaintiff attempts to hold an employer, such
as the school board, liable for the actions of non-employees, such as students, courts take into
account the control of the employer over non-employees. Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97
CV 7109(APR), 2001 WL 1328921, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001). The court observed:
There are, of course, distinctions between student-on-student harassment and
student-on-teacher harassment, the most important of which is that a victim
student has no disciplinary authority over the harassing student, while a victim
teacher wields at least nominal disciplinary authority. It is therefore conceivable
that school officials would owe a greater duty of protection to powerless students
than to teachers. Nevertheless, as a general rule, school administrators and school
board officials have disciplinary authority that exceeds that of a classroom
teacher, such as the power to suspend students and take other actions not
commonly carried out by individual classroom instructors.
Id. at *6.
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standard—that a reasonable, similarly situated plaintiff would have been
affected.99
B.  Setting the Standard for Student-on-Teacher Sexual Harassment
“Despite the authority of teachers in the teacher-student relationship,
teachers are subjected to objectionable sexual behaviors by students.”100
Over the past twenty years, investigators have discovered a variety of
instances in which male students have sexually harassed female
teachers.  Studies show that in most cases of student-on-teacher sexual101
harassment, the victim is a female teacher.  Although some sexually102
suggestive behaviors of students may be written off as “boys . . . ‘just
being boys,’” many of these behaviors directed towards teachers have
included the grabbing of teachers and “unwanted sexual comments and
obscene remarks.”  Until recently, “analysts have questioned whether this103
behavior constitutes true sexual harassment because of the inherent power
differences between teachers and students.”  The behaviors in question104
have also been termed “‘sexual hassling’” by these analysts, instead of
sexual harassment, indicating behaviors that might otherwise be offensive
but may not rise to the level of harassment.105
The apparent disparity between the protective treatment received by
students and the cold-shoulder treatment expected by teachers as victims
of sexual harassment might have been justified by Congress and federal
benches of generations past. However, as protections for students have
grown, so must the protections safeguarding their educators. Such
treatment of teachers is unjust: teachers cannot justifiably be left to fend
for themselves. 
Perhaps most unsettling, some school officials have blamed the
teachers for being harassed by students.  “Researchers have discovered106
that until recently, the sexual harassment of . . . female teachers was
frequently a hidden but accepted part of the curriculum.”  Before107
99. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483. Title VII also contains an anti-retaliation provision. See Alex
B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of
Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933–37 (2007); Lindsay Roshkind, Comment,
Employment Law: And Adverse Action Against Employers: The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Title
VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 59 FLA. L. REV. 707 (2007).
100. MOREWITZ, supra note 37, at 301. 
101. See id. at 302.
102. See id. at 301.
103. Id. (quoting CARRIE M.H. HERBERT, TALKING OF SILENCE: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OF SCHOOLGIRLS 4 (1989)).
104. Id. at 302.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 303. 
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legislation existed for teachers, a “[l]ack of knowledge and taboos toward
sexual harassment” enabled “objectionable sexual behaviors to occur
without sanctioning from school officials.”108
In 2005, in Plaza-Torres v. Rey, a federal district court in Puerto Rico
recognized that although a teacher could bring an action for sex
discrimination under Title IX, by no means was such a claim her only
method of recourse.  Noting that “the issue of whether a school may be109
held liable for student-on-teacher harassment has not been expressly
resolved,”  the court concluded a teacher “may seek redress under Title110
VII” against the school district “for the sexual harassment suffered on
account of one of her students.”  In this landmark decision, the court111
explained that “Title VII seeks to eliminate all forms of sex discrimination
in all work environments” and “absent clear directive from the U.S.
Supreme Court . . . we will not limit the reach of Title VII liability by
closing the door on student-on-teacher harassment.”112
The court then addressed the issue of the school’s liability for the
teacher’s Title VII sexual harassment claim.  The school district argued113
that the teacher’s claims under Title VII should be dismissed because a
school district cannot be held liable for the actions of a student and
because the teacher did not establish that the district failed to take
corrective action.  “[A]n employer’s liability for hostile environment114
sexual harassment depends on the relationship between the employer and
the person responsible for the sexual harassment.”  The court dismissed115
the school district’s argument because it found “[t]he basis for liability in
this case is clear.”  The court explained “[a]n employer/school is liable116
‘[i]f an official representing that institution knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known of the harassment’s occurrence,
unless that official can show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt
it.’”117
108. Id.
109. See Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 179 (D.P.R. 2005).
110. Id. at 181.
111. Id. at 182.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 183; see also Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F. Supp.
2d 108, 112 (D.P.R. 2002) (distinguishing the applicable standards for employer liability as a result
of sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor or by a coworker).
116. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
117. Id. (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (alteration in
original)).
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In this case, the teacher resigned two months after she informed her
school’s officials about the harassment.  After establishing its theory of118
recovery for teachers under Title VII, the court in Plaza-Torres denied the
school district’s motion for summary judgment. Under Title VII, the court
held the issue of “[w]hether two months is enough time to take an
appropriate corrective action against sexual harassment in the work place
is an issue of fact which is reserved for the jury.”119
In Plaza-Torres, the court relied on several recent decisions to
determine whether a school can be held “liable for the misconduct or
sexual harassment perpetrated by one of its students upon a
teacher/employee of the school.”  Rejecting the school district’s120
invitation to dismiss the harassed teacher’s claims since a cause of action
for student-on-teacher sexual harassment has not been established by
either the U.S. Supreme Court or the First Circuit, the court reasoned such
a cause of action “may be inferred from recent Title VII, Equal Protection
and Title IX case law.”  Existing precedent clearly establishes that a121
school may be held liable both for teacher-on-student harassment and for
student-on-student harassment, while an employer may be held liable for
harassment of an employee by a supervisor, of an employee by a
coworker, and even of an employee by a non-employee such as a
customer.  In the same manner that an employer may be held liable for122
customer-on-employee harassment, the Plaza-Torres court ultimately held
that a teacher may bring a cause of action for student-on-teacher
harassment.  The court relied on a “handful of cases which suggest that123
student-on-teacher harassment is cognizable under Title VII.”124
C.  A “Special” Exception?
“[S]pecial education students who are prone to disruptive behavior by
virtue of their disabilities”  used to be placed in separate special125
education classes apart from other students. Now, however, federal law
places these students, regardless of the severity of their disabilities, “in the
most normal or regular school setting possible where [they] can be
118. Id. at 184.
119. Id.
120. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 181.
123. Id. at 182 (“[A]bsent clear directive from the U.S. Supreme Court or the First Circuit
Court, we will not limit the reach of Title VII liability by closing the door on student-on-teacher
harassment. After all, Title VII seeks to eliminate all forms of sex discrimination in all work
environments.”).
124. Id. at 181.
125. Mongelli, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
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successful.”  Do the unique circumstances surrounding special education126
students require a “special” exception for sexual harassment?
In Mongelli v. Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of
Education, a male ninth-grade special education student sexually harassed
a special-education teacher eight times over twelve days.  The student127
directed vulgar comments and sexually suggestive gestures towards the
teacher, and physically grabbed her several times.  Following school128
protocol, the teacher made numerous written referrals to the principal’s
office, and the student was suspended several times for up to five days.129
The harassment occurred in front of the teacher’s other students.130
The court admitted that, under the circumstances, the student’s conduct
could be described as humiliating, and not merely an offensive
utterance.  In addition, the court recognized the harassment “could have131
interfered with [the teacher’s] work performance by disrupting the
classroom and undermining her authority as a teacher.”  Despite the132
student’s disturbing conduct, for which he had since been charged
criminally, the court concluded, mainly because the student’s actions had
occurred over a short period of time, that the teacher failed to establish a
prima facie case of a hostile work environment against the school district
and that “the severity of the conduct and the context in which it took place
[were] not sufficient to satisfy Title VII’s ‘severe or pervasive’
requirement.”  The court reasoned that even if the student’s conduct was133
found to satisfy the severe or pervasive requirement, the teacher
nonetheless “failed to establish that a reasonable person in her situation
would have been detrimentally affected by the objectionable conduct.”134
Although the court conceded “a school may be held liable for
student-on-teacher harassment, even if the harasser is a special education
student,”  it was unwilling to allow the teacher’s claim to succeed. In135
attempting to shield the defendant school district from liability, the court
cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., emphasizing that “the objective severity of harassment
126. STUART E. SCHWARTZ & CRAIG A. CONLEY, HUMAN DIVERSITY: A GUIDE FOR
UNDERSTANDING 613 (4th ed. 2000). Many educators prefer to place children with disabilities in
the regular education classroom and “to provide whatever services are needed in that setting so that
the children are successful in that environment.” Id.
127. Mongelli, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 471–73.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 472, 474.





135. Id. at 480 n.20 (emphasis added).
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should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances, including careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and
is experienced by its target.”  Relying on Oncale, the school district136
argued that within the context of special education in which the harasser
was a special-needs student, the behavior could not be severely abusive or
hostile as a matter of law.  137
Admittedly, “it is not uncommon for special education students to act
out in an inappropriate manner . . . .”  However compelling the argument138
may be for forbidding a special-education student’s actions from being
considered sexual harassment, the court was not persuaded to make a
bright line rule that “no special education student’s behavior could ever
constitute harassment actionable under Title VII.”  The court appeared139
willing to find a teacher a victim of sexual harassment under Title VII,
under circumstances much more severe or pervasive than those faced by
this teacher. This decision, however, leaves a reasonable person perplexed
as to how severe or pervasive the harassing behavior must actually be for
a successful claim. Mongelli reveals that the court interpreted the colorful
language of Oncale through a stripped-down, all-or-nothing lens,
effectively leaving the teacher with no relief in sight.
A blanket prohibition immunizing schools from liability for harassment
of a teacher by a special education student would be “a disservice to
teachers, who deserve a working environment free from abuse, and would
provide schools with no incentive to remedy incidents of harassment in
their special education classrooms.”  Nevertheless, “the requisite140
threshold of abuse will necessarily be higher than with students lacking
developmental disabilities,” yet “harassment of teachers by special
education students can constitute a hostile work environment for Title VII
purposes.”  To date, there is no authority that “imposes a different141
standard of sexual harassment because developmentally disabled
individuals are involved.”142
The message the Mongelli court sends to teachers, especially those of
special-education students, is frightening. The court recognized that “while
plaintiff has made it clear that she was subjectively offended by [the
student’s] behavior, nothing in the record purports to show where the
136. Id. at 480 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
137. See id. at 480–81.
138. Id. at 481.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 478.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Shocking Decision Holding that Teacher Does Not State Sexual
Harassment Claim Against Student, Adjunct Law Prof. Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adj
unctprofs/2007/07/teacher-does-no.html (July 9, 2007).
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tolerance threshold of a reasonable special education teacher lies, let alone
whether it was crossed in the case at bar.”  Essentially, when a teacher,143
in front of the other students in her class, is repeatedly “grabbed
forcefully,” “hump[ed],” told her “nipples are hard,” and is
“pulled . . . close to [a student’s] body” while being called a derogatory
name,  there still is insufficient evidence from which a jury could144
possibly determine that this behavior has detrimentally affected a
reasonable special education teacher in the plaintiff’s position.  Although145
the court admits there is no precedent for a tolerance threshold of
harassment, a jury of fact-finders would be quite capable of making such
a determination. Shockingly, what would typically be thought of as an
issue for a jury to resolve—determining a tolerance threshold of
harassment—was swiftly swept under the carpet. In granting the school
district’s motion for summary judgment,  the Mongelli court, in effect,146
closed the door on any possibility of relief for a special education teacher
bringing a Title VII claim, even though it expressly declined to adopt such
a bright line rule.147
D.  Reasoning in the Right Direction: Support for Student-on-Teacher
Sexual Harassment Claims
Although the cases described in this Part employ different legal
arguments, they all have one thing in common: they uniformly suggest that
a cause of action under Title VII for student-on-teacher harassment should
be recognized.
In Peries v. New York City Board of Education, a teacher filed suit
against the New York Board of Education for failing to take remedial
action against a student who harassed him because of his race and national
origin.  The teacher filed suit under Title VII, arguing the student’s148
“name-calling, mimicking, and other abuse created a hostile work
environment.”  The district court held that the teacher could prevail on149
an action for sexual harassment against the school if he could show “first
that a hostile environment existed and second that the school board either
provided no reasonable avenue of complaint or knew of the harassment
143. Mongelli, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
144. Id. at 472.
145. Id. at 481.
146. Id.
147. Id. (“[T]he court has declined defendants’ invitation to find that no special education
student’s behavior could ever constitute harassment actionable under Title VII.”).
148. Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109(APR), 2001 WL 1328921, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001).
149. Id. at *6.
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and failed to take appropriate remedial action.”  The court reasoned that150
school board officials and school administrators are charged with a
“disciplinary authority that exceeds that of a classroom teacher” and
includes “the power to suspend students and take other actions not
commonly carried out by individual classroom instructors.”  151
Most important to this Note, however, was the court’s conclusion that
summary judgment of the plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the school
was improper since “[t]he question of whether school officials took
appropriate remedial action is a question of fact, not law.”  Reconciling152
the Peries holding, where the school board’s motion for summary
judgment was denied, with Mongelli is a challenge to say the least. Instead
of dismissing the plaintiff’s claim in Mongelli on summary judgment, the
court could have followed the logical opinion of the Peries bench.
Specifically, Peries decided that “the jury will have to make a decision ‘by
looking at all the circumstances’ surrounding the harassment, . . . including
the severity of the abuse, the nature of the humiliation, its interference
with [the plaintiff’s] teaching, and its effect on his psychological well-
being.”  Even if the jury is not convinced by the teacher’s allegations, the153
Peries court believed the question should not be resolved by the court on
a motion for summary judgment.  The saving grace for the  Mongelli154
court was that Peries is persuasive, rather than controlling, judicial
authority.
The Mongelli court chose to ignore the Peries court’s reasoning and
thus created a conflict among federal district courts as to when a question
of fact in school sexual harassment cases exists. Two additional cases,
Schroeder v. Hamilton School District  and Lovell v. Comsewogue155
School District,  provide further support for the conclusion that156
harassment of a teacher by a student is actionable.  In both of these cases,157
teachers sued their school districts for not taking any significant measures
to prevent harassment from their students because of the teachers’ sexual
orientation.  Both cases were filed under the Equal Protection clause,158 159
and the courts “recognized that a cause of action for student-on-teacher
harassment is actionable under the Equal Protection clause.”  In addition,160
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *7.
153. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002).
156. 214 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
157. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
158. Id. 
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
160. Id. at 182.
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the Schroeder court noted that if this were “a Title VII case, the defendants
could be liable . . . if [the plaintiff] demonstrated that they knew he was
being harassed and failed to take reasonable measures to try to prevent
it.”  The Mongelli court should have taken into account the underlying161
recognition from Schroeder and Lovell that school districts could be held
liable under Title VII.
In Howard v. Board of Education, a teacher filed suit under Title IX
against the school district for sexual harassment by fellow teachers and
students.  The court held the teacher’s Title IX claim was precluded by162
Title VII and accordingly dismissed the claim.  The court noted “Title163
VII provides a comprehensive scheme for aggrieved individuals to enforce
the prohibition against discrimination in employment,” suggesting that had
the teacher filed a claim under Title VII she would likely have been
successful.  The Plaza-Torres court, in its analysis of student-on-teacher164
sexual harassment claims under Title VII, interpreted Howard as not
rejecting the possibility of a Title VII student-on-teacher harassment claim
against the school board.165
Although several courts have recognized student-on-teacher harassment
in the context of Title VII, unfortunately, these decisions are merely
persuasive: none have been the work of the Supreme Court nor have any
of them been codified into an applicable federal statute. As such, these
well-reasoned holdings are of little help to victims such as the plaintiff in
Mongelli. 
E.  Principles of Agency Theory Hard[ly] at Work
Before the Court decided Meritor in 1986,  courts were divided “on166
whether in hostile environment cases the plaintiff could rely on agency
principles . . . .”  “In Meritor, the Court expressed general approval of the167
use of agency law—that is, law governing when one person should be held
to have acted on behalf of another—to determine whether the employer
should be vicariously liable, leaving it open to lower courts to fashion
standards case by case.”  After Gebser was decided in 1998, it was clear168
that in sexual harassment law, a “plaintiff will either need to show that the
161. Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002).
162. Howard v. Bd. of Educ., 893 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
163. Id. at 815.
164. Id. 
165. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
166. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See Part I.A, supra.
167. FRANCIS, supra note 22, at 51 (“The basic premise of agency law is that the acts of the
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agent was acting within the scope of responsibilities or will need to
establish some other basis for attributing the agent’s conduct to the
principal.”  Therefore, in hostile environment cases, “the employer is169
liable . . . if the employer knows of the harassment and negligently fails to
correct it . . . .”170
In Plaza-Torres, the court recognized “the applicable standard [in
considering student-on-teacher harassment] is the one utilized in customer-
on-employee harassment . . . .”  In Plaza-Torres, the court dismissed the171
school district’s argument that even if the student’s behavior was
considered harassment, the teacher would have no recourse under Title VII
because the EEOC Guidelines  do not include students as examples of172
third parties or non-employees for which an employer may be held liable
for sexual harassment.  By their very nature, EEOC Guidelines contain173
examples of the situations in which employer liability attaches for non-
employee conduct, but the list is not exhaustive.  The court based its174
conclusion on the EEOC guidelines, which provide:
An employer may also be held responsible for the acts of
non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of
employees in the workplace where the employer (or its agents
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of
the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission
will consider the extent of the employer’s control and any
other legal responsibility which the employer may have with
respect to the conduct of such non-employees.175
Thus, it is evident “the term ‘non-employee,’ as defined in EEOC
Guidelines, does not exclude students, especially if the [c]ourt finds that
a school has control and legal responsibility over student misconduct.”176
If the behavior of students creates a hostile work environment “and the
educational institution knows about it, it will be liable if it fails to take
‘immediate and appropriate corrective action . . . .’ [T]he type of
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
172. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2008) (emphasis added)).
176. Id. (emphasis added); see also Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109(APR),
2001 WL 1328921, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001) (recognizing that while a victim teacher wields
at least nominal disciplinary authority over a student harasser, as a general rule, school districts and
school officials have disciplinary authority, such as the power to suspend students, that exceeds the
authority of individual classroom teachers).
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appropriate steps the school should take will differ depending on the level
of control the school has over the third party harasser.”  The Plaza-177
Torres court ultimately held that “[u]nnecessary restriction in the scope of
employer liability under Title VII is inappropriate absent any legal
authority to that effect.”  178
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor first expressed general approval
of using agency principles as a guide for interpreting Title VII.179
Notwithstanding the judiciary’s recent connection between agency
principles and Title VII,  courts have remained hesitant to apply those180
principles to Title VII.
IV.  CONCLUSION: WHAT WILL IT TAKE FOR A TEACHER TO
SUCCESSFULLY BRING A CLAIM AGAINST A STUDENT?
Courts must give teachers the ability to bring Title VII claims and win.
To make this a reality, courts should establish a bright-line rule allowing
juries to consider a victim’s case after being harassed once or on several
occasions instead of dismissing the case outright on summary judgment.
Alternatively, courts should set a clear standard on the amount of time a
teacher must endure harassment before a teacher can file a claim. Absent
any such established guidelines, teachers are left to fend for themselves,
swinging aimlessly in a ring of phantom Title VII protections. 
As the law stands now, a teacher cannot determine how much
harassment they must endure—and for how long—before they can bring
a Title VII claim. From Mongelli, it is evident that eight incidents of
sexually harassing behavior directed at a teacher over twelve days do not
constitute conduct of a legally sufficient nature to reach a jury. In contrast,
in Plaza-Torres, the court found a jury could consider whether multiple
incidents of harassment lasting two months constituted illegal
discrimination.  In an educational system with a “zero tolerance”181 182
policy, a reasonable commentator is hard-pressed to determine a middle
ground between the findings of Mongelli and Plaza-Torres. Essentially,
courts have articulated that a reasonable person would not be affected by
harassment over a twelve-day period, but might be affected by harassment
over a two-month period. From afar, these two conclusions may be seen
177. FRANCIS, supra note 22, at 58 (quoting Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of
Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,040 (Mar.
13, 1997)).
178. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183–84.
179. See Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
180. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 137–46 and accompanying text.
182. See generally Stein, supra note 71, at 143–54 (discussing the interplay between
zero-tolerance policies and the recognition of sexual harassment in schools by the courts). 
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as viable boundaries for a cause of action against a student harasser. As a
result, this line of reasoning sends a message to teachers suffering from
harassment by their students that they must endure humiliating and
demeaning verbal and physical assaults for at least two months if they
want a chance at recovery. In order to protect our nation’s educators, the
judiciary needs to give some teeth to the idea that teachers can bring suit
under Title VII and win.
With the number of teacher-on-student harassment claims far
exceeding the number of student-on-teacher harassment claims, courts are
seemingly better equipped for considering the protections available to
students as opposed to victimized teachers. Nevertheless, student-on-
teacher sexual harassment under Title VII needs the same clarity afforded
to student-on-student and teacher-on-student sexual harassment under Title
IX. Teachers should not need to endure more severe harassment for a
longer period of time than employees in non-educational settings to
successfully bring a Title VII claim.
While advocating for the underdog typically isn’t the most popular
position, it certainly is one that needs to be recognized in our democracy.
Victimized teachers deserve the same tools to fight harassment that
victimized students have. The Plaza-Torres court momentarily led
teachers to believe that redress for their student harassers was in the
making and must be credited for attempting to tackle what inevitably will
become another form of equal protection for both students and teachers.
As cases like Mongelli work themselves through the costly federal appeals
process, the Supreme Court should come to recognize teachers as victims
of sexual harassment by their students, ultimately effectuating their
recovery under a Title VII line of attack.
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